From Court-Surrogate to Regulatory Tool: Re-Framing the Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration by Weidemaier, W. Mark C.
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 
Volume 41
2008 
From Court-Surrogate to Regulatory Tool: Re-Framing the 
Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration 
W. Mark C. Weidemaier 
University of North Carolina School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr 
 Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons, and the Labor and Employment Law 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
W. Mark C. Weidemaier, From Court-Surrogate to Regulatory Tool: Re-Framing the Empirical Study of 
Employment Arbitration, 41 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 843 (2008). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr/vol41/iss4/4 
 
This Symposium Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Michigan Journal of Law 
Reform at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
FROM COURT-SURROGATE TO REGULATORY TOOL:
RE-FRAMING THE EMPIRICAL STUDY OF
EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION
W. Mark C. Weidemaier*
A growing body of empirical research explores the use of arbitration to resolve em-
ployment disputes, typically by comparing arbitration to litigation using relatively
traditional outcome measures: who wins, how much, and how quickly. On the
whole, this research suggests that employees fare reasonably well in arbitration. Yet
there remain sizeable gaps in our knowledge. This Article explores these gaps with
two goals in mind. The first and narrower goal is to explain why it remains ex-
ceedingly difficult to assess the relative fairness of arbitration and litigation. The
outcome research does not account for a variety of 'filtering" mechanisms that in-
fluence the relative merits of the cases adjudicated in each system. This Article
explores these filters, focusing on one in particular: most employee grievances are
resolved within the workplace through relatively informal procedures. Workplace
structures thus filter out most employee grievances before they reach arbitration.
This fact has significant implications for efforts to interpret the arbitration out-
come research. It also highlights the significance of the workplace as a locus of
dispute resolution activity. Indeed, a growing body of research focuses directly on
workplace compliance and grievance procedures.
Recognizing the significance of workplace dispute resolution leads to this Article's
broader goal. That goal is to expose, and hopefully bridge, an artificial conceptual
divide that separates the arbitration research from research into workplace dispute
resolution. Many researchers view internal compliance and grievance procedures
as a means of harnessing the employer's own regulatory capacity. This conception
drives a research agenda that explores the role of workplace structures in
generating private norms and in implementing (or subverting) public norms like
anti-discrimination. By contrast, the arbitration outcome research conceives of
arbitration narrowly as a court surrogate, one that should ideally yield equivalent
outcomes at lower cost. Although legitimate to a degree, this conception artificially
separates arbitration from other employer-structured disputing procedures and
yields an empirical agenda that leaves fundamental questions unanswered. This
Article closes by discussing two of these questions: First, do arbitrators play a
meaningful regulatory role, either by shaping other arbitrators' practices or by
shaping the terms of arbitration contracts? Second, under what circumstances do
arbitrators effectively generate and enforce norms ?
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law. This Article
elaborates on a presentation made at the January 2008 Association of American Law Schools
Annual Meeting. I thank Omri Ben-Shahar for inviting me to participate. For comments on
early drafts of this Article, thanks to Rachel Arnow-Richman, Scott Baker, Christopher Dra-
hozal, Adam Feibelman, MelissaJacoby and Kim Krawiec.
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade or so, a growing body of empirical re-
search has explored the use of arbitration to resolve employment
disputes. Much of this research compares arbitration to litigation
using relatively traditional measures of outcome: who wins, how
much, and how quickly. On the whole, employees appear to fare
reasonably well in arbitration.
Yet there remain sizeable gaps in our knowledge. This Article
explores these gaps with two goals in mind. The first, and nar-
rower, goal is to explain why it remains exceedingly difficult to
assess the relative fairness of arbitration and litigation. This is be-
cause the outcome research does not account for a variety of
"filtering" mechanisms that influence the relative merits of the
cases adjudicated in each system. Part I of this Article explores
these filtering mechanisms, focusing on one mechanism in particu-
lar: employers resolve most employee grievances within the
workplace, long before they are filed as formal legal claims. In-
deed, workplace dispute resolution may be an equally if not more
important phenomenon than arbitration itself, and it is the subject
of a growing body of research.'
This Article's second, and broader, goal is to argue that an artifi-
cial conceptual divide between arbitration and workplace dispute
resolution has limited the arbitration research agenda in impor-
tant ways. As Part II explains, many researchers conceptualize the
workplace as a "law-making" body and workplace grievance proce-
dures as part of a broader, employer-structured regulatory process.
This conception has driven a research agenda concerned with the
capacity of workplace structures to implement (or subvert) impor-
tant public norms and to generate private norms in the absence of
governing law.
By contrast, the arbitration outcome research implicitly or ex-
plicitly conceives of arbitration as a surrogate for the courts-that
1. I use the terms "grievance procedure" and "dispute resolution procedure" inter-
changeably, although in the sociological literature the terms "grievance" and "dispute" have
discrete meanings. A "grievance" occurs when an individual believes "that he or she ... is
entitled to a resource which someone else may grant or deny." Richard E. Miller & Austin
Sarat, Grievances, Claims, and Disputes: Assessing the Adversary Culture, 15 LAw & Soc'y REv.
525, 527 (1980-81). Not all grievances are expressed; those that are communicated to the
responsible party are "claims," and claims that are rejected in whole or in part become "dis-
putes." Id. These distinctions, however, are relatively unimportant for my purposes, and I use
both terms to refer to procedures for resolving expressed employee grievances-i.e.,
"claims." Note that, within the workplace, many employee claims may not be legally cogni-
zable causes of action.
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is, as a quasi-external forum for enforcing individual rights. 2 This
conception has driven a research agenda concerned primarily with
comparing the outcomes of arbitrated to litigated disputes. This
research is extraordinarily valuable, and the conception of arbitra-
tion that drives it is undeniably legitimate. But the conception is
also artificial. Part II argues for a conceptual shift, one that explic-
itly acknowledges that arbitration is not merely a court surrogate
but is also part of a broader, employer-structured regulatory proc-
ess. Conceptualizing arbitration in this manner illuminates a
number of important empirical questions that have yet to be ade-
quately addressed. Part II closes by briefly discussing two of these
questions: First, do arbitrators play a meaningful regulatory role,
either by shaping other arbitrators' practices or by shaping the
terms of arbitration contracts? Second, how effectively do arbitra-
tors generate and apply both public and private norms?
I. ARBITRATION OUTCOME RESEARCH: THE CONVENTIONAL
WISDOM, WITH SOME CAVEATS
A. The Existing Research at a Glance: Higher Win-Rates But
Lower Awards in Arbitration
Much of the empirical research on arbitration compares the
outcomes of arbitrated to litigated disputes using fairly traditional
outcome measures: speed of disposition, the frequency with which
employees prevail on the merits (win-rate), and the size of the
awards received by successful employees. Though relatively sparse,
this research tends to paint employment arbitration in a reasonably
favorable light.3 At least at first glance, the research suggests that
employees win more often, and more quickly, in arbitration, but
2. Of course, courts also act as external monitors, policing the efficacy of workplace
compliance and grievance procedures. It remains an open question whether arbitration can
serve a similar policing function.
3. Professor St. Antoine provides a valuable summary of that research in his sympo-
sium contribution. See Theodore St. Antoine, Mandatory Arbitration: Why it's Better Than it
Looks, 41 MICH.J.L. REFORm 783 (2008). See also HoYT N. WHEELER ET AL., WORKPLACEJUS-
TICE WITHOUT UNIONS 47-68 (2004); Richard A. Bales, Normative Consideration of Employment
Arbitration at Gilmer's Quinceadera, 81 TUL. L. REv. 331, 342-52 (2006); AlexanderJ.S. Colvin,
Empirical Research on Employment Arbitration: Clarity Amidst the Sound and Fury, 11 EMP. RTs. &
EMP. POL'Y J. 405, 412-34 (2007); David Sherwyn, Samuel Estreicher & Michael Heise, As-
sessing the Case for Employment Arbitration: A New Path for Empirical Research, 57 STAN. L. REV.
1557, 1567-78 (2005). The existing research into arbitration remedies focuses on the mone-
tary relief awarded to employees; thus, it does not have much to say about whether
arbitration can effectively reshape workplace practices-whether by injunctive relief or by
inducing employers to voluntarily change challenged workplace practices.
SUMMER 2008]
846 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 41:4
that average monetary awards to successful employees are larger in
court.
Perhaps the clearest area of research relates to disposition times
and demonstrates that arbitrators resolve disputes much more
quickly than courts.4 Most studies, moreover, report employee win-
rates in arbitration that exceed those reported by studies of em-
ployment litigation.5 Although the research into how much
4. See, e.g., Bales, supra note 3, at 343; Sherwyn et al., supra note 3, at 1578. The exist-
ing research generally compares the time between the filing of the arbitration demand and
the arbitration award to the time between complaint filing and the trial court's judgment.
This comparison does not take account of the additional time needed to obtain a court
order confirming the arbitrator's award, a necessary step in converting the award into an
enforceable judgment. Doing so would reduce, although probably not eliminate, arbitra-
tion's speed advantage. However, including time devoted to appeal would likely enhance
arbitration's speed advantage given the relatively limited grounds for vacating an arbitrator's
award, compared to the more expansive appellate review available for court judgments.
5. For relevant studies, see, e.g., Lisa B. Bingham, Emerging Due Process Concerns in Em-
ployment Arbitration: A Look at Actual Cases, 47 LAB. L.J. 108 (1996) (examining outcomes in a
sample of AAA arbitrations); Lisa B. Bingham & Shimon Sarraf, Employment Arbitration Before
and After the Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising Out of
Employment: Preliminary Evidence that Self-Regulation Makes a Difference, in ALTERNATIVE Dis-
PUTE RESOLUTION IN THE EMPLOYMENT ARENA: PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW YORK
UNIVERSITY 53D ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 303 (Samuel Estreicher & David Sherwyn
eds., 2004) (AAA arbitrations); Lisa B. Bingham, Is There a Bias in Arbitration on Non-Union
Employment Disputes, 6 INT'L J. OF CONFLICT MGMT. 369 (1995) (studying AAA arbitration
outcomes from 1992); Lisa B. Bingham, Unequal Bargaining Power: An Alternative Account for
the Repeat Player Effect, 50th Proceedings of the Industrial Relations Research Association 1998 An-
nual Conference in Employment Arbitration, 1 INDUS. REL. RES. ASS'N SERIES 33 (1998)
[hereinafter Bingham, Unequal Bargaining Power] (AAA arbitrations); Stuart H. Bompey &
Andrea H. Stempel, Four Years Later: A Look at Compulsory Arbitration of Employment Discrimina-
tion Claims after Gilmer v. Interstate /Johnson Lane Corp., 21 EMP. REL. L.J. 21 (1995)
(surveying awards rendered in NYSE and NASD arbitrations); Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart
J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Plaintffs Fare in Federal Court, I J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 429, 451-56 (2004) (evaluating trends in employment litigation from 1979-2001);
Michael Delikat & Morris M. Kleiner, An Empirical Study of Dispute Resolution Mechanisms:
Where do Plaintffs Better Vindicate Their Rights, DIsP. RESOL. J., Winter 2003, at 56, 58 (com-
paring results of NYSE and NASD arbitration to one federal district court); Theodore
Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Arbitration and Litigation of Employment Claims: An Empirical Com-
parison, DisP. RESOL. J., Jan. 2004, at 44, 48-49 (comparing AAA awards to federal and state
court trial outcomes); Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Models and Trial Outcomes in Civil Rights
and Prisoner Cases, 77 GEO. L.J. 1567 (1989) (examining data from federal civil rights cases,
including employment discrimination cases); Elizabeth Hill, AAA Employment Arbitration: A
Fair Forum at Low Cost, DIsP. RESOL. J., May-July 2003, at 8 (evaluating AAA arbitration
awards); William M. Howard, Arbitrating Claims of Employment Discrimination, DIsP. RESOL. J.,
Oct.-Dec. 1995, at 40 (comparing AAA and securities arbitration to federal court trial out-
comes); Michael H. LeRoy, Getting Nothing for Something: When Women Prevail in Employment
Arbitration Awards, 16 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 573 (2005) (evaluating results of arbitration
awards challenged in court); Marika FX. Litras, Bureau ofJustice Statistics Report on Civil Rights
Complaints Filed in U.S. District Courts, DAILY LABOR REPORT, Jan. 20, 2000, at E5-E17 (report-
ing on cases, including employment discrimination cases, terminated in federal district
courts in 1998); Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30
COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 29 (1998) (comparing federal trial outcomes from 1994 to AAA
arbitration); and David B. Oppenheimer, Verdicts Matter: An Empirical Study of California Em-
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successful employees win is a bit less clear, most studies report
smaller average awards in arbitration.5' A variety of methodological
concerns, however, require that we qualify this relatively conven-
tional understanding of the research. Because others have noted
many of these concerns,7 my primary goal in the following section
is to marshal empirical support demonstrating their significance.
That is, the following section demonstrates why, even if we concern
ourselves only with traditional outcome measures like win rates and
award amounts, the existing research does not permit firm conclu-
sions about the relative merits of arbitration versus the courts.
B. Methodological Limitations, and Why They Matter
To illustrate the limitations of the existing research, Figure 1
represents the process of dispute resolution as a funnel. Employee
claims originate within the workplace and are often resolved there
by relatively informal grievance procedures; those that remain un-
resolved may be filed as formal legal claims either in arbitration or
litigation." After being filed, claims may be abandoned, settled, or
resolved by some form of pre-trial adjudication, such as by sum-
mary judgment. Only a small minority of claims result in a trial or
an arbitration award.
ployment Discrimination and Wrongful Discharge Jury Verdicts Reveals Low Success Rates for Women
and Minorities, 37 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 511, 516 (2003) (reviewing 1998 and 1999 California
wrongful discharge and employment discrimination jury verdicts).
6. See St. Antoine, supra note 3, at 792; Bales, supra note 3, at 349; Sherwyn et al., su-
pra note 3, at 1576.
7. For more exhaustive treatment of some of the methodological concerns, see Bales,
supra note 3, at 347-51; Sherwyn et al., supra note 3, at 1564-66.
8. Of course, this is not to say that all employee grievances that remain unresolved af-
ter being raised within the workplace will be asserted as formal legal claims. Many employees
will simply "lump it." See Miller & Sarat, supra note 1, at 527; see also David M. Trubek et al.,
The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REv. 72, 85-87 (1983) (reporting survey results
that lawsuits were filed in only 11.2% of disputes involving over $1,000 in 1983).
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As Figure 1 suggests, various "filtering" mechanisms are in play
that may produce systematic differences between arbitration and
litigation. Employers who arbitrate may be more or less effective at
resolving employee claims within the workplace. If so, claims filed
in arbitration may differ systematically from those filed in litiga-
tion. Even if there are no systematic differences in the kinds of
claims that are filed in each system, pre-trial filtering mechanisms
may produce systematic differences in the claims that reach trial
(or a merits hearing in arbitration)."° If comparable claims do
reach trial, the question arises whether arbitration and litigation
produce different results. The existing outcome research is con-
cerned with this last question. As the following discussion suggests,
however, there is reason to interpret this research with caution.
1. Workplace Structures as Internal Filters
Arbitration is not the only form of "alternative" dispute resolu-
tion relevant to employment disputes. Instead, arbitration is often
the last step in an employer-structured and largely informal process
for resolving employee grievances." Most employee grievances are
9. Figure 1 inverts the usual disputing pyramid, which places the filing of a lawsuit
and ensuing trial at the top of the pyramid. See David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary
Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REv. 72,86-87 (1983-1984).
10. Unless the context demands otherwise, I will use the terms "trial" and "pre-trial" in
both their ordinary sense and to refer, respectively, to the merits hearing in arbitration and
to the period between the filing of the arbitration demand and the merits hearing.
11. See, e.g., Sherwyn et al., supra note 3, at 1565-66.
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resolved through informal means within the workplace.12 Thus, the
debate over arbitration's fairness as a disputing forum-that is, the
debate over the privatization of dispute resolution-obscures an
equally and perhaps more important development: the internaliza-
tion of dispute resolution within the workplace.
2
Not all employers have formalized, internal grievance proce-
dures, and those that have them do not follow a common
template. 4 Nevertheless, some basic generalizations are possible.
Workplace grievance procedures are generally sequenced so that
employees first assert grievances informally and locally, then
gradually invoke more formal internal processes if dissatisfied with
the results of earlier stages, and then involve external actors like
mediators and arbitrators only if internal processes fail to provide a
satisfactory resolution.
12. See infra note 26. Again, note that many of these grievances may not constitute le-
gally cognizable claims. E.g., Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A
Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 458, 502 (2001) (noting one company's telephone
complaint process encourages employees "to call the call-center for anything from, 'I want a
parking spot' to 'I think my performance review was unfair' to 'I am being harassed.' ").
13. The significance of workplace grievance procedures has not gone unremarked. See,
e.g., Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105
COLUM. L. REv. 319, 337 (2005) (referring to internal compliance and grievance procedures
as "front-line" mechanisms for enforcing important public norms). Nor has the significance
of workplace structures in implementing (or perhaps subverting) important public norms.
For treatments assessing the promise and perils of legal regulation of (and deference to)
workplace structures, see, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Anti-
discrimination Law, 94 CAL. L. REv. 1, 20-47 (2006) (expressing skepticism that the law can
promote workplace structures that will effectively promote equality); Estlund, supra, at 387-
402 (exploring the promise of a system of "monitored self-regulation"); Tristin K Green, A
Structural Approach as Antidiscrimination Mandate, 60 VAND. L. REv. 849, 857-65 (2007) (em-
phasizing the need to change organizational context by obliging employers not to facilitate
or enable bias in workplace decision-making); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and
the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487, 510-15, 522-41 (2003) (critically
evaluating the empirical foundation for the view that internal compliance structures deter
prohibited conduct and emphasizing the problematic incentives of regulated firms and legal
compliance professionals); Sturm, supra note 12, at 522 (envisioning a "dynamic and recip-
rocal relationship between judicially elaborated general legal norms and workplace-
generated problem-solving approaches").
14. For example, these internal procedures (and potentially even mediation and arbi-
tration) are designed to handle the full range of workplace grievances, including grievances
that are not legally cognizable claims. See, e.g., Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Dispute Resolution
in the Boundaryless Workplace, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. REsOL. 467, 487 (2001). Where em-
ployees do have legally cognizable claims-especially involving sexual or racial harassment-
employees may be able to skip early phases of the process. See, e.g., AlexanderJ.S. Colvin, The
Relationship Between Employment Arbitration and Workplace Dispute Resolution Procedures, 16 OHIO
ST.J. ON Disp. REs. 643, 652 (2001). In short, organizations have varied approaches to man-
aging both internal and external conflict. For a survey of organizational approaches to
conflict management, see David B. Lipsky et al., An Uncertain Destination: On the Development
of Conflict Management Systems in U.S. Corporations, in ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN
THE EMPLOYMENT ARENA: PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 53RD ANNUAL CON-
FERENCE ON LABOR, supra note 5, at 109.
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For example, open door policies encourage employees first to
raise grievances with managers and may also establish channels for
appealing the manager's decision to a superior or to someone out-
side the chain of command." These basic workplace grievance
procedures essentially "formalize the employee's ability to present
complaints to management."' 6 An employee who does not receive a
satisfactory resolution may sometimes invoke more formal internal
dispute resolution procedures. 7 These more formal procedures
may include peer review panels, in which other employees or a
combination of employees and human resources personnel render
a decision on the employee's claim, senior managers charged with
investigating the employee's claim, or company ombudspersons
who attempt to facilitate a resolution to the employee's claim. 8 If
internal procedures fail, many employers require or permit media-
tion using third party neutrals.'6  Only claims that remain
unresolved are likely to be asserted as formal legal claims in arbi-
tration or litigation.0
As mentioned previously, employers' internal dispute resolution
procedures do not follow a common template.2 ' Nevertheless, it is
common for employers to utilize some combination of the forego-
ing procedures.2 The existing evidence suggests two important
facts about the relationship between arbitration and other em-
ployer-designed procedures. 5 First, employers who arbitrate may
be more likely to have robust internal dispute resolution proce-
15. See, e.g., Colvin, supra note 14, at 646.
16. Id.
17. See David Lewin, Dispute Resolution in Nonunion Organizations: Key Empirical Findings,
in ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE EMPLOYMENT ARENA: PROCEEDINGS OF THE
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 53RD ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR, supra note 5, at 379, 381-82.
18. See, e.g. Colvin, supra note 14, at 647-48.
19. See id. at 648.
20. For additional descriptions of employer dispute resolution procedures, see Sher-
wyn et al., supra note 3, at 1565-66, 1586; Lewin, supra note 17, at 381-83; Stone, supra note
14, at 480-82.
21. See supra note 14.
22. See, e.g., Lewin, supra note 17, at 379 (estimating that one in two non-union em-
ployers may have in place a formal system to resolve employee grievances).
23. Although I use the term "employer-designed," I do not mean to suggest that each
employer customizes arbitration or other dispute resolution procedures for itself. As with
any other contract, professional intermediaries-lawyers, human resources professionals,
arbitrators and arbitral organizations-play an important role in designing and disseminat-
ing contract terms. Indeed, the question whether we should expect substantial variation in
how employers design these procedures taps into a deeper debate over the impact of stan-
dardization on contract innovation. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner,
Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (Or "The Economics of Boilerplate"), 83 VA.
L. REV. 713 (1997). For a discussion of these issues in the arbitration context, see Steven J.
Choi, The Problem With Arbitration Agreements, 36 VAND.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1233 (2003).
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dures in place. For example, in a survey of telecommunications
industry employers, Alexander Colvin found that employers that
elected to use arbitration were significantly more likely also to have
in place workplace dispute resolution procedures like management
appeal boards, peer review panels, ombudspersons, and mediation
procedures.' Second, where internal disputing procedures are in
place, the evidence suggests that they resolve the vast majority of
employee grievances-perhaps 95% or more-before they reach
arbitration.26
The link between employers' use of arbitration and their adop-
tion of internal dispute resolution procedures has significant
implications for empirical research into arbitration outcomes. For
one thing, employers may use internal dispute resolution processes
to identify and resolve potentially valid legal claims within the
workplace. Although it is far too early to draw firm conclusions,
there is some indirect evidence that this occurs. For example, a
study by Elizabeth Hill found that "repeat-player" employers who
maintained an internal dispute resolution process won at arbitra-
tion much more frequently than repeat-player employers who did
21not maintain such a process.
If internal dispute resolution procedures indeed work as a filter,
and if employers who require arbitration more often have such
24. See, e.g., Colvin, supra note 14, at 649 (describing prior survey of telecommunica-
tions industry employers and finding that employers using arbitration were significantly
more likely to also use other workplace dispute resolution procedures).
25. See id. at 649-50.
26. See, e.g., Alexander J.S. Colvin, Adoption and Use of Dispute Resolution Procedurs in the
Nonunion Workplace, 13 ADVANCES INDuS. & LAB. REL. 71, 75-87 (2004) (studying the inter-
nal dispute resolution process of one manufacturing company and noting that, of the
seventy-two total disputes that went to mediation or arbitration between 1995 and 1997, only
three resulted in an arbitration); Lewin, supra note 17, at 386 (indicating that for nonunion
employers with arbitration as the last step of a dispute resolution system, between 4-5% of
employee grievances are resolved in arbitration); Sherwyn et al., supra note 3, at 1587-88
(reporting that, for the employer they studied, only 5% of the claims submitted to the dis-
pute resolution program went to arbitration). Again, not all of the claims resolved by
internal procedures will be legally cognizable. See supra note 14.
27. Hill, supra note 5, at 15. Hill found that twenty-five of the thirty-four "repeat-
player" cases in her sample also involved an employer with other internal dispute resolution
procedures, and that the win/loss ratio in arbitration for these employers was much higher
(3.2:1) than the ratio for employers generally (1.3:1) or for repeat-player employers who did
not have in-house dispute resolution procedures (1.25:1). Id.
Even if replicated, these findings may be due to other factors. For example, because
workplace grievance procedures may provide a defense to certain discrimination claims,
employers with such procedures in place may win more frequently when these claims reach
arbitration. For discussion of these defenses, and of the relative paucity of discrimination
cases in the arbitration samples that have been studied, see infra notes 43 & 72. Alternatively,
internal grievance procedures may allow employers to gather information about the em-
ployee's claim and thus better prepare for disputes that reach arbitration.
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procedures in place, then claims filed in arbitration might have
less merit than those filed in court.2s But the research appears to
reveal the opposite pattern, at least with respect to win-rates. 9 This
may be evidence that arbitration is a superior forum for employees,
or it may simply cast doubt on the notion that employers who arbi-
trate have more effective internal filters in. place. To complicate
matters further, other differences between arbitrating and litigat-
ing employers may affect the relative merits of the claims filed in
each system. For example, it is conceivable that discrimination-
prone employers benefit the most from arbitration and that other
employers prefer to litigate.30 If so, employees who arbitrate should
have more meritorious claims and (all else equal) should appear to
fare better in arbitration. In that case, the higher win rates re-
ported in arbitration would reveal little if anything about the
relative merits of arbitration as a disputing forum.'
Perhaps the most that can be said is that there are legitimate
reasons to suspect that claims filed in arbitration may differ sys-
tematically from those filed in litigation. But we do not know how
they are likely to differ. This makes it exceedingly difficult to draw
firm conclusions from the outcome research.
2. Settlements and Pre-Trial Motions as Filters
Even if employees file identical claims in arbitration and litiga-
tion, the two systems may differ in how they "filter" cases after
filing but before trial.2 One possibility is that there are systematic
28. See, e.g., Sherwyn et al., supra note 3, at 1566.
29. See supra text accompanying notes 3-7.
30. See Scott Baker, A Risk-Based Approach to Mandatory Arbitration, 83 OR. L. REv. 861,
864 (2004). It is possible (though certainly contestable) that employers who do not dis-
criminate pay a premium for arbitration-either in the form of increased wages or increased
disputing costs-and therefore may prefer to resolve employee claims in court. See id. at
882-88.
31. For a related point about potential differences between employers who require ar-
bitration and those who do not, see Stephen J. Ware, The Effects of Gilmer: Empirical and Other
Approaches to the Study of Employment Arbitration, 16 OHIo ST. J. ON Dxsp. REsOL. 735, 756-57
(2001) (listing, as potential differences, that employers who use arbitration might (1) have
better (or worse) lawyers or human resources departments, (2) have more experience de-
fending employment discrimination claims, (3) have better (or worse) reputations for how
they treat their employers, or (4) be more or less capable of paying a large verdict).
32. For different assessments of settlement dynamics and their implications for how
cases are selected for trial, see Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement Under Imperfect
Information, 15 RANDJ. EcoN. 404 (1984) (focusing on impact of information asymmetries in
settlement decisions); George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litiga-
tion, 13J. EmP. LEG. STUD. 1 (1984) (modeling settlement process in which, given symmetric
stakes, plaintiff win-rates will approach 50% regardless of the overall merit of filed cases). See
also Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal Anything About
[VOL. 41:4
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differences in the kinds of disputes that settle.3 The vast majority-
perhaps 70% or more-of cases filed in court settle. 4 Although it is
sometimes assumed that few disputes settle after being filed as
formal legal claims in arbitration, 5 the limited empirical evidence
suggests otherwise. For example, one study found that 45.5% of
the cases filed in arbitration over a two year period resulted in a
settlement.36 So it is possible that cases filed in arbitration may be
less likely to settle than cases filed in court. Lower settlement rates,
of course, do not necessarily imply systematic differences in the
kinds of cases that settle. Nevertheless, it is at least possible that
such differences exist.
37
Pre-trial adjudication-for example by summary judgment-is a
more significant filtering mechanism. A substantial percentage of
employment disputes filed in court are resolved by pretrial motion.
One study, for example, reported that 19.2% of employment dis-
crimination lawsuits.filed in federal court over a twenty-year period
were resolved by non-trial adjudication. 38 Employees lost the vast
majority of these adjudications.9 Although there is no reliable evi-
dence on the frequency with which arbitrators grant pre-hearing,
dispositive motions, most observers quite reasonably assume such
rulings to be infrequent." If that is so, many arbitration hearings
may result in an employer victory for reasons that would have
the Legal System? Win-Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 581 (1998) (explor-
ing the impact of case selection effects on win-rate data).
33. Filed claims are not always settled or resolved on the merits. Some are simply
abandoned by the claimant. Differences in the kinds of cases abandoned in each system may
also produce a different pool of cases for trial.
34. See, e.g., Charles Silver, Does Civil Justice Cost Too Much?, 80 TEx. L. REv. 2073, 2107-
09 (2002). See also Clermont & Schwab, supra note 5, app. at 457 (reporting settlement rates
of 69.10% for discrimination claims and 71.09% for contract and tort claims from 1979-
2000).
35. See Howard, supra note 5, at 45.
36. Eisenberg & Hill, supra note 5, at 52 (computed by aggregating the data for both
1999 and 2000).
37. See id. It is unclear what mechanism might produce differential settlement patterns
in arbitration and litigation. One possibility is that litigation may present asymmetric stakes
for plaintiffs and defendants. For many defendants, an adverse courtjudgment not only will
impose direct financial costs but also may create a precedent with reputational or future
legal consequences. Under these conditions, some theories predict both relatively higher
settlement rates and relatively higher defendant win-rates. See Priest & Klein, supra note 32,
at 25-26; Daniel Kessler et al., Explaining Deviations fiom the Fifty-Percent Rule: A Multimodal
Approach to the Selection of Casesfor Litigation, 25J. LEGAL STUD. 233, 242 (1996). The evidence
does not allow a definitive assessment but is consistent with this prediction.
38. See Clermont & Schwab, supra note 5, app. at 457.
39. See id. (reporting that employees won only 4.23% of pretrial adjudications in fed-
eral employment discrimination cases from 1979-2001); see also Maltby, supra note 5, at 47
(reporting from 1994 data that employers won 98% of the pre-trial dispositive motions in
federal employment discrimination cases).
40. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 30, at 887-88; Sherwyn et al., supra note 3, at 1566.
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prevented the dispute from reaching trial in court.4' This possibility
suggests that focusing only on trial outcomes can make arbitration
appear less favorable to employees. A more appropriate compari-
son of arbitration outcomes to litigation outcomes might take into
account all forms of adjudication, including pre-trial as well as trial
rulings.2
3. Different Claims and Claimants: Other Differences
Between Arbitrated and Litigated Disputes
Given differences in workplace and pre-trial filtering, it is rea-
sonable to suspect that samples of arbitrated and litigated disputes
may differ in the relative merits of the claims being asserted.
Moreover, samples of arbitrated and litigated disputes are known
to differ in additional ways. The following discussion explores two
of these differences-the prevalence of civil rights claims and the
prevalence of lower-pay employees. The research has made some
headway in accounting for these latter differences, but it has yet to
account for the impact of workplace and pre-trial filtering.
Civil rights claimants comprise only a small minority of samples
of arbitrated disputes, generally in the range of 2.5-19.5%. 43 By
contrast, civil rights claimants appear much more frequently in
samples of employment litigation.44 This difference in sample
composition matters: employees asserting civil rights claims fare
relatively poorly compared to other civil litigants. Civil rights
claimants are less likely to receive a favorable award than are em-
ployees asserting other kinds of claims, although successful civil
rights claimants may receive larger damages awards. 6 Thus, if re-
searchers do not control for the presence of civil rights claims, it
41. See, e.g., Eisenberg & Hill, supra note 5, at 52; Sherwyn et al., supra note 3, at 1566.
42. See Sherwyn et al., supra note 3, at 1566.
43. See, e.g., Bingham, Emerging Due Process Concerns, supra note 5, at 115 tbl.5 (2.5% of
a sample of 1993 AAA arbitration awards involved discrimination claims; I computed this
figure by excluding the fifty-two cases for which Bingham lacked information about case
type); Eisenberg & Hill, supra note 5, at 49 (19.5% of sample involved civil fights claims);
Hill, supra note 5, at 12 (noting that civil rights claims are relatively infrequent in arbitra-
tion; only 7% of Hill's sample involved such claims); U.S. Gen. Accounting Office,
Employment Discrimination: How Registered Representatives Fare in Discrimination Disputes,
GAO/HEHS-94-17, at 7 (1994) (noting that, of the 572 employment disputes arbitrated in
1991 and 1992 by NYSE or by NASD's New York office, only 18 (3.1%) were discrimination
cases).
44. See, e.g., Eisenberg & Hill, supra note 5, at 49 (52.5% of state court sample). Sam-
ples of federal employment litigation often involve only civil rights claims. See Maltby, supra
note 5, at 47.
45. See Clermont & Schwab, supra note 5, at 455, fig. 12.
46. See Eisenberg & Hill, supra note 5, at 47, 49-51.
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may appear that employees win more often, but win less money, in
arbitration than in court. (This is, of course, exactly what the re-
search shows. 7) But this will be due to the different claims being
adjudicated, not to differences in the disputing systems themselves.
Studies of arbitration and litigation may also differ in the preva-
lence of lower-pay employees in the relevant samples.48 On
occasion, information about employee income can be gleaned
from arbitration records and awards. 49 Researchers have also iden-
tified lower-pay employees by proxy, as those employees who are
subject to a broadly applicable arbitration plan promulgated by
their employer-for example, in an employee handbook or per-
sonnel manual-rather than those employees who have
individually negotiated employment contracts containing an arbi-
tration clause. 0 As Professor St. Antoine notes, these lower-pay
employees appear with some frequency in arbitration.5' Indeed,
lower-pay employees have generally comprised between one-third
and two-thirds of the sample in studies of arbitration. 2
It is not easy to determine employee income from standard
sources of information about court filings and judgments. Never-
theless, there is reason to believe that lower-pay employees appear
infrequently in court.53 Because employee salary is likely to corre-
late positively with award size, this means that awards to successful
employees may appear smaller in arbitration than in court.5 4 Once
47. See supra text accompanying notes 3-7.
48. These differences may be due to the relatively low cost of arbitration, or to its ac-
cessibility as a forum for pro se claimants, rather than to any pre-trial or workplace filtering
mechanism. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and Forum Accessibility: Empirical
Evidence, 41 MICH.J.L. REFORM 833-35 (2008); Sherwyn et al., supra note 3, at 1575.
49. See, e.g., Hill, supra note 5, at 11 & 17 n. 14 (determining income data from the con-
tent of arbitration awards).
50. See, e.g., Lisa Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of Statistics in
Judicial Review of Employment Arbitration Awards, 29 MCGEORGE L. REv. 223, 237 (1998);
Eisenberg & Hill, supra note 5, at 47.
51. St. Antoine, supra note 3, at 796.
52. See, e.g., Bingham, supra note 50, at 239 tbl.4 (35.9% of sample, computed from the
table); Bingham, Unequal Bargaining Power, supra note 5, at 39 (reporting the same results);
Bingham & Sarraf, supra note 5, at 323 tbl.2 (31.1% of sample, computed from the table);
Eisenberg & Hill, supra note 5, at 48 tbl.1 (61.9%, computed from the table).
53. See Eisenberg & Hill, supra note 5, at 27-28 (noting a link between provable dam-
ages and salary); Howard, supra note 5, at 44 (discussing responses to survey in which
plaintiffs' lawyers indicated that they required, on average, minimum provable damages of
$60,000 or more and a retainer of $3,000 to $3,600 before accepting an employment dis-
crimination claim).
54. See Eisenberg & Hill, supra note 5, at 47. The relative speed of arbitration further
complicates any comparison between trial outcomes and the outcomes of merits hearings in
arbitration. This is because some elements of an employee's claim for damages, like back
pay, are time-sensitive. For these elements, quicker dispute processing should yield lower
awards. See Sherwyn et al., supra note 3, at 1589.
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again, however, this difference may have nothing to do with the
relative merits of arbitration and litigation.
Beyond lowering the mean award to successful employees, the
relative prevalence of lower-pay employees in arbitration may re-
duce the overall win-rate for employee claimants. Studies have
consistently shown lower win-rates for employees who arbitrate
pursuant to a personnel manual-and who therefore are likely to
have a standardized employment agreement-than for employees
with individually-negotiated employment contracts.5 Although it is
not clear that these lower win-rates are problematic, 6 including
lower-pay employees in samples of arbitrated disputes produces a
lower win-rate than would otherwise be the case. Without more
specific information on employee income, it is at least arguable
that comparisons between arbitration and litigation should focus
on the higher-pay employees who are likely to appear in both sys-
tems.
C. The Outcome Research (Briefly) Revisited
As the foregoing discussion indicates, there are both theoretical
and empirical reasons to believe that meaningful differences exist
between arbitration and litigation in the kinds of claimants and
legal claims involved, and also in the relative merits of the claims
being adjudicated. Fortunately, a few studies do account for some
of these concerns, for example by separating higher- from lower-
pay employees, distinguishing civil-rights from other employment
claims, or attempting to account for pre-trial dispositions. By and
large, however, the research does not account for the possibility
that workplace and pre-trial filtering mechanisms may produce dif-
ferences in the relative merits of the claims adjudicated in the two
systems.57
55. See, e.g., Bingham, On Repeat Players, supra note 50, at 239 tbl.4; Bingham & Sarraf,
supra note 5, at 323 tbl.2; see also Colvin, supra note 3, at 418-19 (finding win-rate of 19.7%
in study of employment arbitrations pursuant to employer-promulgated agreements);
Eisenberg & Hill, supra note 5, at 48 tbl.1 (reporting a 39.6% win-rate for lower-pay employ-
ees asserting non-civil rights claims, compared to 64.9% for higher-pay employees).
56. Recall that these are primarily contract claims, not civil rights claims. Lower-pay
employees who base their claims on a standardized employment contract-perhaps alleging
that an employee handbook converts an apparently at-will employment relationship into
one where employees may be terminated only for cause-may have rather different claims
than employees with individually-negotiated employment contracts. The differential success
rates for lower- and higher-pay employees in arbitration is worthy of further study.
57. See supra text accompanying notes 27-29 for the impact of workplace dispute reso-
lution procedures.
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For example, Ted Eisenberg and Elizabeth Hill compared
American Arbitration Association employment awards to state and
federal court trial outcomes, reporting separate results for civil-
rights and non-civil-rights claimants and for higher- and lower-pay
employees. 8 They found no statistically significant differences be-
tween arbitration and litigation in terms of win-rates or award
amounts for higher-pay employees asserting non-civil-rights
claims.5 Another study, by Michael Delikat and Morris Kleiner, fo-
cused solely on employment discrimination disputes, comparing a
sample of securities-industry arbitration awards to trial verdicts
rendered in one federal district.6° Employees won significantly
more often in arbitration but the mean award was substantially
higher in court." A third study, by Lewis Maltby, found that al-
though employees won 44% of the time at trial, they won only
14.9% of all definitive judgments rendered by courts.62 And al-
though the mean award-measured as a percentage of the amount
demanded by employees-was higher for employees who won at
trial than for those who won in arbitration, the mean award was
lower in court once pre-trial adjudications were taken into ac-
count.
63
58. Eisenberg & Hill, supra note 5.
59. Id. at 48, 50. Directionally, the differences between the arbitration and court sam-
ples were consistent with the conventional understanding of arbitration outcome research.
Higher-pay employees asserting non-civil-rights claims won more often in arbitration than in
state court (64.9% versus 56.6%), and the median award was also higher in arbitration
($94,984 versus $68,737), but the mean award was higher in state court ($462,307 versus
$211,720). There were too few higher-pay employees asserting civil-rights claims in arbitra-
tion to permit meaningful comparisons to civil-rights plaintiffs in court. Id. Lower-pay
employees, by contrast, won less often and less money in arbitration than did plaintiffs in
court. Id. For non-civil-rights claimants, these differences were statistically significant when
compared to state court outcomes for both win-rates and award amounts. Id. The authors
assumed, plausibly, that higher-pay employees dominated the court cases. Id. at 47.
60. Delikat & Kleiner, supra note 5.
61. See id. at 57. Employees won 46% of the time in arbitration and 36% of the time at
trial. This difference was statistically significant. The difference between the mean award in
court ($377,030) and in arbitration ($237,703) was marginally significant, with a sample
comprised of 125 trial verdicts and 186 arbitration awards. Id. at 56-57.
62. Maltby, supra note 5, at 47, 49. Maltby compared this to a 63% win-rate reported in
a prior study of AAA arbitrations, although it is unlikely that the AAA sample contained
many civil rights claims. (All of the trial outcomes reported by Maltby were federal civil-
rights claims.)
63. Maltby, supra note 5, at 47-49 (reporting mean award of 70% of demand for trial
outcomes versus 25% for arbitration awards, but that, once all merits adjudications were
taken into account, employees won only 10.4% of the amount demanded in court, versus
18% in arbitration). At the time of the Maltby study, the up-front fee due from arbitration
claimants increased with the size of the claimant's demand. Court filing fees, by contrast,
generally do not increase with the amount demanded. See Drahozal, supra note 48, at 817.
Thus, the arbitration claimants studied by Maltby had an incentive to moderate their de-
mands, and the apparently greater recoveries in arbitration may simply reflect the fact that
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The results of these studies are generally consistent with the
conventional understanding noted above.64 That is, they report that
employees win as often or more often in arbitration, especially
when pre-trial dispositions are taken into account, but they also
suggest that employees who win at trial may receive higher awards,
at least when asserting civil rights claims. Nevertheless, the re-
search does not permit us to assess the impact of workplace and
pretrial filters on the relative merits of the claims being adjudi-
cated. This severely complicates any attempt to compare
arbitration to litigation outcomes. The relative frequency of pre-
trial adjudication in court may mean that weaker claims are less
likely to reach trial.65 And if employers who use arbitration differ
from those who do not-in their propensity to discriminate, 6 in
their ability to "filter" out legally meritorious claims within the
workplace,6 7 or for some other reason-these differences are likely
to affect the relative merits of the cases that reach the stage of for-
mal adjudication.
Perhaps more importantly, the existing research focuses princi-
pally on traditional outcome measures like disposition time,
win-rate, and award amount. Yet because most employee claims are
resolved within the workplace, 6s the research illuminates only a
small corner of the world of employment dispute resolution. In-
deed, it may be that workplace dispute resolution is a more
important dispute resolution phenomenon than arbitration itself.
There is, in fact, a significant body of research examining work-
place compliance and grievance procedures. By and large,
however, that research engages a different set of questions than the
arbitration research engages. The remainder of this Article ex-
plores why that might be, and what the arbitration research can
learn from research into internal dispute resolution.
arbitration claimants made more realistic demands. Christopher R. Drahozal, A Behavioral
Analysis of Private Judging, 67 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105, 129 n.143 (2004). Major arbitra-
tion providers no longer apply graduated fee schedules to arbitrations conducted pursuant
to employer-promulgated plans. E.g., Drahozal, supra note 48, at 818.
64. See supra text accompanying notes 3-7.
65. See supra text accompanying notes 38-42.
66. See supra text accompanying notes 30-31.
67. See supra text accompanying notes 27-29.
68. See supra text accompanying notes 26.
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II. THE DIFFERING CONCEPTIONS OF WORKPLACE AND
"EXTERNAL" DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Because this Article has focused so far on the limits of arbitra-
tion outcome research, I have characterized workplace dispute
resolution as a "filter" that influences the relative merits of claims
resolved outside the workplace. This characterization, however, sug-
gests that workplace dispute resolution is important primarily as a
variable to be controlled by researchers interested in studying arbi-
tration outcomes. Yet workplace dispute resolution is also an
important dispute resolution phenomenon that has generated a
significant amount of research.0 Importantly, that research en-
gages questions that are both substantively different from, and
more varied than, the traditional outcome measures that have
been central to arbitration research.
By and large, researchers have conceptualized workplace dispute
resolution and arbitration in entirely different ways, and these dif-
fering conceptions have produced different research agendas.
Many researchers conceptualize grievance procedures and other
workplace structures as regulatory tools capable of implementing
and generating norms within the workplace. By contrast, the arbi-
tration outcome research implicitly conceptualizes arbitration as a
court surrogate-that is, as an external forum for rights enforce-
ment and for ensuring that employers' practices conform to
external law.7" After describing these differing conceptions and re-
search agendas, I close by suggesting that the divide is somewhat
artificial. Indeed, conceptualizing arbitration as a regulatory phe-
nomenon opens up a number of important inquiries into the
regulatory capacity of arbitrators and into arbitration's potential to
generate and enforce norms.
A. Workplace Structures as Regulatory Tools
The fact that most employee grievances are resolved internally
through employer-designed dispute resolution procedures argua-
bly heralds a broader transformation of workplace regulation, one
in which "the locus of enforcement is moving inside the workplace
and away from direct public oversight."'" Thus, regulatory agencies
69. See infra notes 87-93.
70. Certainly, some scholars have conceptualized arbitration as a tool of regulation (or
of self-regulation). See, e.g., Estlund, supra note 13, at 338-40; Stone, supra note 14, at 470-
71. This conception, however, has not meaningfully shaped the empirical research agenda.
71. Estlund, supra note 13, at 325-26.
SUMMER 2008]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
and courts have gradually deferred to workplace structures de-
signed to facilitate compliance with external laws. Employment
discrimination law, for example, allows employers with internal
compliance and grievance procedures to avoid liability or punitive
damages in certain cases, typically those involving workplace har-
assment.72 As a result, internal compliance and grievance
procedures have become "front-line mechanisms for enforcing"
important public norms such as anti-discrimination.
This development has attracted a great deal of scholarly atten-
tion and debate.74 That debate implicates a rich vein of regulatory
theory that seeks to enhance the efficacy of regulation by allowing
regulated firms to participate in shaping the content of regulatory
rules, to monitor their own compliance, and even to correct and
punish instances of noncompliance." The debate also reveals
unique aspirations for workplace structures among some scholars.6
For example, it may be that employers can utilize local, workplace-
specific knowledge effectively to embed regulatory norms and re-
spect for individual rights into the workplace, to identify and
correct violations, and, in the process, to lend further content to
governing external norms.7 Moreover, because workplace relations
are sometimes governed by context-specific norms "that are not
presently embodied in law," workplace-centered procedures may
be superior to public actors like courts at elaborating and imple-
71menting those norms.
Professor Susan Sturm, for example, posits a dynamic relation-
ship between public, norm-generating actors like courts and the
regulated firms responsible for implementing those norms in spe-
cific local contexts. The goal is for accountable workplace
structures to embed public norms into the workplace-something
public regulators, who lack the local knowledge necessary to tailor
context-appropriate solutions, may fail to do79 -and, in the process,
lend further content to the public norms themselves.80 For exam-
72. See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 13, at 21-26; Estlund, supra note 13, at 336-40;
Krawiec, supra note 13, at 503-10.
73. Estlund, supra note 13, at 337.
74. See supra note 13.
75. See, e.g., IAN AYRES &JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION 101-32 (1992).
See generally Colin Scott, Regulation in the Age of Governance: The Rise of the Post-Regulatory State
in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 145 (JacintJordana & David Levi-Faur eds., 2004) (explor-
ing theoretical approaches to regulation and the range of mechanisms through which state
control might be asserted).
76. See, e.g., Sturm, supra note 12, at 553-66; Estlund, supra note 13, at 387-402.
77. See Sturm, supra note 12, at 463.
78. Stone, supra note 14, at 470.
79. See Bagenstos, supra note 13, at 18-20; Sturm, supra note 12, at 522-23.
80. See Sturm, supra note 12, at 522.
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pie, rather than "enforce predefined compliance standards" for
public norms like anti-discrimination, courts might seek "to induce
employers to participate in the development of effective internal
systems that give meaning to the general norm ... in context."8' In
turn, employers' efforts to implement the anti-discrimination norm
in specific workplace contexts would enrich courts' understanding
of the general norm and perhaps "enable the articulation of roll-
ing standards" of compliance.82 Workplace structures might pursue
similar aspirations in areas not governed by external law. For ex-
ample, workplaces may generate internal fairness norms to resolve
conflicts between co-workers, or disputes over allocation of re-
sources, that do not give rise to formal legal claims.8s
Some question whether these goals are achievable."4 Internal
grievance procedures, for example, may recast violations of em-
ployee rights as issues of interpersonal conflict.85 It is possible,
moreover, that excessive judicial deference to employers' internal
procedures will subordinate public norms to managerial concerns
as courts come to accept employers' visions of compliance. s The
point, however, is that most observers conceptualize internal griev-
ance procedures as one of many workplace structures that can
internalize (or subvert) public norms and generate private norms
to govern in the absence of external law. And the empirical re-
search into internal compliance and grievance procedures reflects
their unique aspirations and concerns.
For example, a number of researchers have explored the proc-
ess by which external legal norms like anti-discrimination are
internalized within the workplace. This research has various goals,
among them to identify structures associated with effective norm
implementation, to assess the risk of symbolic compliance, and to
investigate how public norms may influence, and be influenced by,
81. Id. at 560.
82. Id. at 562-63. Likewise, Professor Cynthia Estlund has explored the potential of a
system of "monitored self-regulation" in which limited public and private enforcement tools
"induce or coerce firms' entry into and faithful implementation of a system of [monitored]
self-regulation." Estlund, supra note 13, at 402.
83. Stone, supra note 13, at 487-89 (exploring the role of arbitration in implementing
workplace norms and in policing structural employment discrimination).
84. See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 13, 20-40; Krawiec, supra note 13,541-44.
85. See Lauren B. Edelman et al., Internal Dispute Resolution: The Transformation of Civil
Rights in the Workplace, 27 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 497, 511-19 (1993); Lauren B. Edelman & Mark
C. Suchman, When the "Haves" Hold Court: Speculations on the Organizational Internalization of
Law, 33 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 941,967 (1999).
86. See Edelman & Suchman, supra note 85, at 963-64; see also Bagenstos, supra note 13,
at 28-31.
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managerial imperatives."' The underlying premise is that the
workplace is a "law-making bod[y], ' " one that can generate work-
place-specific norms in areas not governed by external law 9 and
elaborate (or perhaps subvert) public norms through the process
of implementing those norms in the workplace. Given that prem-
ise, questions about how workplace structures generate and
implement norms become fundamental. Likewise, scholars pay
close attention to the dynamic between courts and the workplace,
investigating whether judicial oversight enhances employer com-
pliance efforts or merely subverts courts' understanding of
external law.90
Another example illustrates how conceptualizing workplace dis-
pute resolution as a regulatory phenomenon shapes the empirical
agenda. The study of workplace compliance and dispute resolution
treats as fundamental questions of how professional intermediaries
such as lawyers and human resources personnel can facilitate (or
subvert) organizational compliance with external legal norms."'
This emphasis reflects the central role of intermediaries "in medi-
ating the relationship between legal institutions and workplaces."92
Ideally, intermediaries' close ties to the workplace permit them to
fashion context-appropriate solutions to compliance problems,
87. E.g., Edelman et al., supra note 85 (examining how internal complaint handlers
conceptualize and implement civil rights law); Susan Sturm, The Architecture of Inclusion:
Advancing Workplace Equity in Higher Education, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 247 (2006) (explor-
ing organizational structures and strategies for increasing participation of women in
university faculty); see also Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures: Organ-
izational Mediation of Civil Rights Law, 97 Am. J. Soc. 1531 (1992) (examining structural
responses to antidiscrimination law within organizations); Lauren B. Edelman et al., The
Endogeneity of Legal Regulation: Grievance Procedures as Rational Myth, 105 AM. J. Soc. 406
(1999) (exploring evolution of organizational beliefs concerning need for and value of
workplace grievance procedures); Alexandra Kalev & Frank Dobbin, Enforcement of Civil
Rights Law in Private Workplaces: The Effects of Compliance Reviews and Lawsuits Over Time, 31
LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 855 (2006) (examining impact of compliance reviews by the Office of
Federal Contract Compliance Programs, and of lawsuits, on women and minority represen-
tation in management).
88. E.g., Sturm, supra note 12, at 463. See also Edelman et al., supra note 87, at 407
("That organizations are both responding to and constructing the law that regulates them
renders law 'endogenous' ...").
89. See Stone, supra note 14, at 487-88.
90. For critical assessments of courts' deference to workplace grievance procedures
and compliance efforts, see Bagenstos, supra note 13, at 21-26; Krawiec, supra note 13, at
508-09. See also Edelman & Suchman, supra note 85, at 961-64 (exploring consequences of
shifting lawmaking activity from public actors to the workplace).
91. See, e.g., Lauren B. Edelman et al., Legal Ambiguity and the Politics of Compliance: Af-
firmative Action Offices' Dilemma, 13 LAw & POL'Y 73 (1991) (exploring the organizational
role of affirmative action officers); Sturm, supra note 87, at 327-33. For a critical evaluation
of professional intermediaries' roles and incentives, see, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 13, at
26-34; Krawiec, supra note 13, at 522-41.
92. Sturm, supra note 12, at 523.
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while their connections to broader professional communities pro-
vide incentives to vindicate external legal norms and allow the
pooling of information about effective practices across different
workplace settings.3 Whether and under what conditions interme-
diaries in fact play this salutary role is a fundamental research
question.94
None of this is to say that research into workplace dispute reso-
lution entirely eschews traditional "outcome" measures. For
example, researchers have examined workplace grievance proce-
dures to determine how often employee claims are sustained and
what kinds of relief employees obtain.95 Like the arbitration litera-
ture, research into workplace dispute resolution also has
emphasized the need for due process in resolving employee
claims.96 Nevertheless, questions of "who wins and how much" have
been less fundamental to the study of workplace dispute resolution
than they have been to the study of arbitration. This difference in
empirical focus follows directly from the conception of workplace
compliance and grievance procedures as tools that harness the
employer's own regulatory capacity.
B. Alternative Conceptions of Arbitration, and Their
Implications for Research
Implicitly or explicitly, the arbitration outcome research de-
scribed in Part I is premised on the notion that arbitration should
serve as a court surrogate, ideally yielding equivalent outcomes at
93. E.g., Sturm, supra note 12, at 523-24.
94. See, e.g., Edelman, supra note 90; Sturm, supra note 87.
95. For relevant research, see Alexander J.S. Colvin, Adoption and Use of Dispute Resolu-
tion Procedures in the Nonunion Workplace, 13 ADv. IN INDUS. & LAB. REL. 69, 86 (2004)
(finding that one employer paid relatively modest monetary settlements ($2,000 on average)
through mediation, although some employees also received significant non-monetary re-
lief); Lewin, supra note 17, at 383-401 (summarizing existing and original research);
Sherwyn et al., supra note 3, at 1589-90 (finding that the per-claim settlement in disputes
resolved through an employer's internal process was one-fourth of the average amount re-
ceived through EEOC conciliation and attributing the difference to the shorter disposition
time for the employer's process and to the fact that only legally cognizable claims are eligi-
ble for EEOC conciliation).
96. See, e.g., Colvin, supra note 14, at 660-61. There is a broader literature examining
the importance of procedural justice within the workplace, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Using Procedure
to Justify Outcomes: Testing the Viability of a Procedural Justice Strategy for Managing Conflicts and
Allocating Resources in Work Organizations, 12 BAsic & APPLIED Soc. PSYCH. 259 (1991), and
an analogous body of work focusing on procedural justice in arbitration and alternative
dispute resolution more generally, e.g., Richard A. Posthuma et al., Arbitrator Acceptability:
Does Justice Matter?, 39 INDUS. REL. 313 (2000). See also Donna Shestowsky, Procedural Prefer-
ences in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 10 PSYCH. PUB. POL'Y & LAW 211 (2004) (summarizing
research).
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lower cost. For a number of reasons, this is a perfectly legitimate
aspiration. U.S. law relies heavily on private litigation to supple-
ment external monitoring by public agencies. Employee lawsuits
promise not only to vindicate employee rights but also to engage
external actors-the courts-in policing the efficacy of workplace
compliance and grievance procedures. Arbitration agreements,
however, greatly reduce the role courts play in enforcing rights and
monitoring employers.97 When an employee agrees to binding arbi-
tration, the arbitrator will resolve the employee's claim, and under
existing law the arbitrator's interpretation and application of law
will be entitled to near-total deference.98 In this sense, arbitration is
quite literally a surrogate for the court system: it is the closest thing
to an external forum that many employees are likely to see.9 Thus,
it is hardly surprising that the empirical research most relevant to
"mandatory" consumer and employment arbitration attempts to
compare the outcomes of arbitrated disputes to litigated dis-
putes, 10° or to catalogue the terms commonly found in consumer
and employment arbitration agreements.1 1 These questions are
directly relevant to arbitration's efficacy as a forum for rights en-
forcement.
0 2
I do not wish to paint too narrow a picture of arbitration re-
search: that research extends beyond traditional outcome
measures, especially in the field of labor arbitration. For example,
there is a substantial body of research into whether the characteris-
tics of arbitrators, parties, or attorneys affect arbitration
97. Of course, this is true only when an employer elects to require employees to arbi-
trate. Courts retain their traditional role in other cases, although they may defer in similar
ways to workplace grievance procedures. See supra note 90.
98. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2002) (setting forth limited grounds for vacating an arbitration
award).
99. Consistent with the view of arbitration as court surrogate, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly upheld arbitration agreements on the assumption that arbitration permits liti-
gants to vindicate federal statutory rights. See, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531
U.S. 79, 89-90 (2000); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 637 (1985).
100. Traditional outcome measures like win-rate and award amounts have the added
advantage of being relatively easy to measure. They do, however, fail to account for some of
the ways in which arbitration and litigation outcomes may differ. For example, I know of no
research examining whether arbitration awards can effectively reform workplace practices,
either through awards of injunctive relief or by inducing voluntary changes in workplace
practices.
101. See, e.g., LindaJ. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, "Volunteering" to Arbitrate Through
Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer's Experience, 67 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.
55, 64-72 (2004).
102. Regrettably, the existing research sheds little light on whether arbitration can mean-
ingfully fulfill the policing function courts are thought to serve. See supra note 2.
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outcomes. ° There is also a more limited body of research examin-
ing whether arbitrators create precedent. 0 4 And a number of
studies attempt to assess the extent to which arbitrators apply-or
feel bound to apply-external law.105 By and large, however, the
research agenda is shaped by the view that arbitration should be an
effective surrogate for the courts. Thus, the research does not pay
sustained attention to the structural determinants or content of
arbitral law-making.0 6 Nor does the research focus on the role of
professional intermediaries like arbitrators in shaping arbitration
contracts and arbitration procedure.0 7 In short, the majority of
empirical study of arbitration focuses on traditional outcome
measures, and the research that extends beyond these measures
does not yield a clear picture of arbitration's regulatory or norm-
generating capacity.
There is something incongruous, however, about a research
agenda that focuses principally on how well arbitration functions as
103. See, e.g., Brian Bemmels, The Effects of Grievants' Gender on Arbitrators' Decisions, 41
INDUS. & LAB. REL. IEv. 251 (1988); Brian Bemmels, Gender Effects in Grievance Arbitration, 29
INDUS. REL. 513 (1990); Richard N. Block &Jack Stieber, The Impact of Attorneys and Arbitra-
tors on Arbitration Awards, 40 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 543 (1987); Steven B. Caudill & Sharon
L. Oswald, A Sequential Selectivity Model of the Decisions of Arbitrators, 14 MANAGERIAL & DECI-
SION ECON. 261 (1993); Herbert G. Heneman & Marcus H. Sandver, Arbitrators'Backgrounds
and Behavior, 4J. LAB. RES. 115 (1983); Nels E. Nelson & Earl M. Curry, Jr., Arbitrator Charac-
teristics and Arbitral Decisions, 20 INDUS. REL. 312 (1981).
104. See, e.g., Christopher J. Bruce, The Adjudication of Labor Disputes as a Private Good, 8
INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 3, 9-10 (1988); Jeffrey P. Commission, Precedent in Investment Treaty
Arbitration: A Citation Analysis of a Developing Jurisprudence, 24(2) J. INT'L ARB. 129 (2007);
Christopher R. Drahozal, The Iran-US Claims Tribunal and Investment Arbitration: A Citation
Analysis, 3(2) TiSANSNAT'L DIsp. MGMT. 1 (Apr. 2006); see also Christopher R. Drahozal, Is
Arbitration Lawless?, 40 Loy. LA. L. REv. 187, 213-14 (2006) (summarizing evidence).
105. See, e.g., Patricia A. Greenfield, How do Arbitrators Treat External Law?, 45 INDUS. &
LAB. REL. REv. 683 (1992); Michelle Hoyman & Lamont E. Stallworth, The Arbitration of Dis-
crimination Grievances in the Aftermath of Gardner-Denver, 39 ARB. J., Sept. 1984, at 49;
Benjamin W. Wolkinson & Dennis H. Liberson, The Arbitration of Sex Discrimination Grievances,
37 ARB. J., June 1982, at 35; Margaret Oppenheimer & Helen LaVan, Arbitration Awards in
Discrimination Disputes: An Empirical Analysis, 34 ARB. J., Mar. 1979, at 12; Robert Coulson,
Title Seven Arbitration in Action, 27 LAB. L.J. 141 (1976).
106. For example, although it is clear that some arbitration systems have the potential,
at least, to generate precedent, see sources cited supra note 104, we know little about the
structural features that lead to such activity.
107. Scholars have explored the regulatory capacity of arbitrators and arbitral institu-
tions, see, e.g., Richard A. Bales, The Employment Due Process Protocol at Ten: Twenty Unresolved
Issues, and a Focus on Conflicts of Interest, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. REsOL. 165 (2005); Margaret
M. Harding, The Limits of the Due Process Protocols, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 369, 401-04
(2004), and some empirical research has evaluated the impact of arbitration rules on dis-
pute outcomes, e.g., Bingham & Sarraf, supra note 5. But there is little empirical evidence of
how arbitrators impact the design of arbitration systems and the conduct of arbitration hear-
ings. For preliminary discussion of these issues, see W. Mark C. Weidemaier, The Arbitration
Clause in Context: How Contract Terms Do (And Do Not) Define The Process, 40 CREIGHTON L. REv.
655 (2007).
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a surrogate for the courts when it is equally plausible to describe
arbitration as part of the employer's own regulatory apparatus. To
be sure, arbitration is different-at least binding arbitration is
different-because the arbitrator may impose a resolution on the
employer. Nevertheless, much like internal workplace procedures
such as peer review panels, arbitration is an employer-funded and
structured dispute resolution process that ostensibly serves the goal
of ensuring compliance with external legal norms. Like internal
procedures, arbitration contracts and proceedings are shaped by
professional intermediaries-arbitrators and lawyers-with their
own professional values and networks. And much like internal
workplace procedures, public actors like courts play a limited role
in policing the adequacy of arbitration procedures and out-
108comes.
Perhaps more importantly, arbitration's relative institutional
strengths align it rather closely with the normative justification for
allowing employers to participate in shaping and enforcing both
public and private (i.e., workplace-specific) legal norms. For ex-
ample, arbitration fits naturally within a vision of the workplace as
a "lawmaking body," capable of "elaborating and transforming"
public norms by giving them "meaning in context."' °9 Although
arbitrators are not formally bound by prior awards, arbitration has
significant (though not always utilized) law-making capacity. °
Unlike judges, arbitrators can be selected for their sensitivity to
local context, which might plausibly make them superior to courts
at tailoring public norms to specific workplaces, not to mention
better able to identify or create workplace-specific norms in areas
not governed by external law."' Arbitrators' professional networks
might also permit pooling of information about effective practices
108. For critical evaluation of courts' efforts to police internal workplace procedures, see
citations supra note 90. With respect to arbitration, arbitrators' awards are subject to only
minimal judicial review, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2001), and arbitration contracts are policed largely
through state law unconscionability doctrine. SeeJeffrey w. Stempel, Arbitration, Unconscion-
ability, and Equilibrium: The Return of Unconscionability Analysis as a Counterweight to Arbitration
Formalism, 19 OHIO ST.J. ON Disp. RESOL. 757, 764-66 (2004).
109. See Sturm, supra note 12 at 463, 522, 555.
110. See Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through Arbi-
tration, 83 MINN. L. REv. 703, 745-47 (1999). For empirical analyses of the development of
precedent in arbitration, see citations supra note 104.
111. For an example in the context of unionized workplaces, where collective bargain-
ing agreements establish when and how employees may be terminated, see Benjamin
Wolkinson & Mark Roehling, The Arbitration of Weight Discrimination Grievances, DIsp. RESOL.
J., Nov. 2007-Jan. 2008, at 37 (examining how labor arbitrators applying just cause standard
resolve employee grievances based on alleged weight discrimination).
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across workplaces."2 Thus, arbitration has the institutional capacity
to pursue the same norm-generating and enforcing goals held out
for workplace compliance and grievance procedures."'
This is not to suggest that all arbitration systems meet this de-
scription; many will not. Nor is it to suggest that traditional
outcome measures are unimportant. But it is unfortunate that arbi-
tration's capacity as a regulatory tool remains largely unexplored.
For example, arbitrators and their professional associations are po-
tentially important regulatory actors. Major arbitration service
providers have adopted due process rules designed to ensure that
minimum standards of fairness are observed in arbitration hear-
ings. ' 4 These rules are an interesting regulatory phenomenon in at
least two senses. First, the rules are self-regulatory tools by which
the arbitration community regulates its members; the rules seek to
prevent abusive arbitration practices from destroying arbitration's
perceived legitimacy as a dispute resolution process."5 Second, the
rules attempt to regulate employers, for example by inducing
changes in the terms of employer-promulgated arbitration plans."6
Unfortunately, there is little empirical evidence as to the impact
of these rules. We know very little about how widely they have been
adopted."7 Nor do we know very much about how the rules operate
in practice. At first glance, the rules purport to "screen out"
112. Cf. Sturm, supra note 12, at 523 (noting information pooling function performed
by professional intermediaries).
113. A number of scholars have noted the regulatory and norm-generating capacity of
arbitration, and alternative dispute resolution more generally, but the empirical research
has by and large focused elsewhere. See, e.g., Estlund, supra note 13, at 400-02 (exploring
how arbitration could function as a meaningful component of a system of monitored self-
regulation); Harding, supra note 107, at 401-04 (exploring the potential and limits of arbi-
trator self-regulation); Stone, supra note 14, at 471, 487-89 (emphasizing that arbitration
can fill gaps in existing regulatory systems, "blend[ing] internal workplace norms of fairness
with statutory law and contractual rights," and thereby resolve workplace grievances and new
forms of discrimination not yet cognizable under existing law); Susan Sturm & Howard
Gadlin, Conflict Resolution and Systemic Change, 2007 J. OF Disp. RESOL. 1 (2007) (exploring
ADR's potential to generate public norms).
114. See, e.g., Bales, supra note 3, at 341-42; Harding, supra note 107, at 399-404.
115. Harding, supra note 107, at 416-27.
116. See, e.g., AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, AAA REVIEW OF CONSUMER CLAUSES 59 (2006),
available at http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=4453 (asserting that if a business' arbitration clause
does not comply with the Consumer Due Process Protocol, "we will return the filing infor-
mation to the consumer with instructions to pursue other remedies and we will refuse to
administer any other cases until your arbitration agreement is in compliance."); AM. ARBI-
TRATION ASS'N, RESOLVING EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES, A PRACTICAL GUIDE 6 (2006), available
at http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=4426 ("If the Association determines that a dispute resolu-
tion program substantially and materially deviates from at least the minimum of [the
Employment Due Process Protocol] standards, it will decline to administer cases under that
program.").
117. See Harding, supra note 107, at 423.
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one-sided terms, such as punitive damages waivers, from the arbi-
tration process.18 But their impact on individual disputes is in fact
more subtle; they may induce employers to waive one-sided terms
in some cases, but they do not entirely eliminate employers' incen-
tives to include such terms in their contracts.1 9 Finally, there is
little evidence about the impact these rules have had on the terms
of employer-promulgated arbitration plans.20 All of these are wor-
thy subjects of future research.
2'
Beyond their interest as regulatory actors, arbitrators may also
serve an important law-making function. For example, it is by now
clear that at least some arbitration systems generate precedent.
2
But we know very little about the structural determinants of arbi-
tral law-making and even less about the content of arbitral law.
These are important gaps in our knowledge of arbitration. For ex-
ample, some hope that arbitrators can meaningfully redress claims
based on "fairness norms that are not presently embodied in
law." 123 Is this a realistic hope? Such claims would require arbitra-
tors not only to recognize the "legality" of workplace-generated
norms but to accord those norms primacy over traditional em-
ployer prerogatives.
24
Similar questions arise with respect to claims based on external
law. Previously, I suggested that arbitrators might surpass courts in
1their ability to tailor public norms to specific workplace contexts.,
As with internal grievance procedures, however, there is also a risk
that arbitrators will "recast grievances in ways that downplay legal
issues and that focus instead on more typically managerial con-
118. See AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, RESOLVING EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES: A PRACTICAL
GUIDE 14 (2006), available at http://www.adr.org/si.aspid=4426; Harding supra note 107, at
404.
119. Weidemaier, supra note 107, at 664-73.
120. In addition to policing contracts applicable to particular disputes, providers may
review arbitration plans in advance to verify compliance with due process rules. See AM. AR-
BITRATION ASS'N, RESOLVING EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES, A PRACTICAL GUIDE at 6, available at
http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=4426 (instructing employers who intend to use AAA services
in an employer-promulgated plan to notify the AAA of that intent and to provide a copy of
the proposed plan). Such advance review is another mechanism by which providers may
seek to shape the terms of arbitration contracts.
121. Questions about the role arbitration service providers play in generating and dis-
seminating innovative contract terms may be of particular interest to contracts scholars. See
Choi, supra note 23, at 1234-37. Here too there is little empirical work.
122. See citations supra note 104.
123. Stone, supra note 14, at 470.
124. Cf Benjamin Wolkinson & Mark Roehling, The Arbitration of Weight Discrimination
Grievances, Disp. RESOL. J. Nov. 2007-Jan. 2008, at 37 (examining how labor arbitrators
applying just cause standard resolve employee grievances based on alleged weight discrimi-
nation).
125. See supra text accompanying note 111.
868 [VOL. 41:4
From Court-Surrogate to Regulatory Tool
cerns."12 6 Traditional outcome measures like win-rates and award
amounts address this possibility indirectly at best. Nor do tradi-
tional outcome measures help us to assess the scope and content of
the law generated by arbitrators, or to evaluate objections to this
kind of private law-making. For example, arbitrators' primary con-
stituents may be the lawyers who guide the arbitrator selection
process, and lawyers may influence the manner in which arbitra-
tors interpret and apply external laws.' 27 Moreover, arbitrators
might prefer rules that favor their interests, and those of the law-
yers and parties, to socially optimal rules that confer
(uncompensated) benefits on outsiders. 21 Conceptualizing arbitra-
tion-like the workplace itself-as a "law-making body' ' 9 yields a
research agenda that focuses on these important concerns.
CONCLUSION
Conceptualizing arbitration as a surrogate for the court system
has driven an important but limited research agenda. That
research, which focuses on traditional outcome measures like
win-rate and award amount, provides little support for the view that
employees fare materially worse in arbitration. Yet it remains diffi-
cult to draw firm conclusions, in part because the research does
not adequately account for the various ways in which employee
claims are "filtered" both within the workplace and before trial.
More importantly, conceptualizing arbitration solely or primarily
as a surrogate for the court system creates an artificial divide be-
tween arbitration and dispute resolution that takes place within the
workplace. Arbitration can also be conceptualized as part of a
broader, employer-structured regulatory process, and doing so
126. Edelman & Suchman, supra note 85, at 967.
127. For example, lawyers may have professional incentives to favor indeterminate
rules. See, e.g., Krawiec, supra note 13, at 528-32 (discussing problematic incentives of legal
compliance professionals). For that matter, lawyers' professional interests may conflict with
important public goals, like the elimination of workplace discrimination (and the conflict
that discrimination generates).
128. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8J. LE-
GAL STUD. 235, 238-39 (1979). In theory, courts might be better producers of socially
optimal rules, although given the impact of lawyers on case selection and presentation there
may be reason for doubt. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42
DUKE L.J. 557, 620 (1992) (discussing lawyers' interest in indeterminate rules). See also Paul
H. Rubin & MartinJ. Bailey, The Role of Lauyers in Changing the Law, 23J. LEGAL STUD. 807,
825 (1994) ("For those bodies of law where there are no other organized parties with strong
interests in the form of the law, then the law should come to favor the interests of lawyers.").
129. Sturm, supra note 12, at 463 (referring to workplaces and nongovernmental insti-
tutions that influence workplace practices).
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illuminates a number of important empirical questions. These
questions, which include inquiries into the regulatory and
law-making capacity of arbitrators, are fundamental to our under-
standing of arbitration's significance as a disputing phenomenon.
